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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1959
lien holder. Draftsmen of purchase-money mortgages in Washington
should be extremely thorough in determining whether or not there are
in fact prior mechanics' or matterialmen's liens against the interest of
the "reputed" owner-mortgagor. YANCEY RESER
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Statutory Construction-Retroactivity of Legislation-Workman's
Compensation Act-Host-Guest statute. In Hammack v. Monroe St.
Lumber Co.1 the Washington court held that the 1957 legislative act'
amending Washington's Workman's Compensation Act' and abolish-
ing the immunity proviso contained therein would not be construed
retroactively.
Appellant (plaintiff in trial court) was injured in a traffic accident
due to the negligent operation of a truck driven by respondent's em-
ployee. The appellant sued for both personal injuries and property
damage. As both parties were in the course of extrahazardous employ-
ment as defined by the act, the trial court dismissed the action. The
dismissal was based on the immunity proviso which was then in effect:
"[N]o action may be brought against any employer or any workman
under this act as a third person if at the time of the accident such em-
ployer or such workman was in the course of any extrahazardous
employment under this act."'
Upon appeal,5 the supreme court reversed in part, holding that the
immunity extended only to actions for personal injury and not to an
action for property damage. The case was remanded for further find-
ings to determine what had been the final disposition of the appellant's
claim for compensation under the act.'
The case was pending in superior court on remand on the effective
date of the repealing statute.' Appellant then claimed that the re-
spondent was no longer entitled to the defense provided by the statu-
tory immunity, but the trial court held that the immunity proviso was
1154 Wash. Dec. 217, 339 P.2d 684 (1959).
2 Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 70 § 23.
8 RCW title 51.
4 Wash. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 132 § 1.
5 Hammack v. Monroe St Lumber Co., 49 Wn.2d 581, 303 P.2d 1095 (1956).
6 The court's theory was that a rejection of the claim on the ground that the work-
man was not in the course of his employment would be res judicata in a subsequent
action against the employer. Young v. Department of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 138,
93 P.2d 337 (1949) ; Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 84 P.2d 397 (1938).
7 Technically, the 1957 act was an amendment which simply dropped the immunity
provision and not a direct repealing act.
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still applicable to the action. The supreme court affirmed and it is this
decision that forms the basis of this Note.
A majority of the court felt that since the appellant had no cause of
action at the time of the accident (because of the immunity proviso),
to apply the repealing act retroactively would be to impose liability
where there was none at the time of the act in question. Such an
attempt, thought the court, would be unconstitutional. The majority
held that the act abolishing the immunity proviso was not procedural,
but dealt exclusively with substantive rights, and as the legislature had
evinced no clear intent that the act should apply retrospectively, the
act would not be given that construction.'
Three judges dissented on the ground that the immunity proviso had
not abolished the cause of the action but only raised a bar thereto-a
statutory defense. This, being granted by the legislature, could also be
taken away at any time in the same manner that it was created. Thus,
the repealing statute, being remedial legislation (in that it removed the
bar to the injured workman's remedy of suing the third party tort-
feasor) came under a different rule of construction9 and should have
been applied retroactively. The dissenters could see no logical distinc-
tion between the construction to be given to a statutory cause of action
and a statutory defense, and since the court had always held that a
statutory cause of action could be divested at any time prior to final
adjudication," they felt that the same construction should apply to the
statutory immunity.
The focal point of divergence between the two conflicting views"
stems from the different interpretations of the immunity proviso. The
majority held that the proviso abolished the injured workman's statu-
8 The general rule of statutory construction is that statutes will be construed as
prospective only unless the legislature has evinced a clear intent that the act should be
applied retroactively. In re Wind's Estate, 32 Wn.2d 64, 200 P.2d 748 (1948) ; Lynch
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19 Wn.2d 802, 145 P.2d 265 (1944) ; State ex rel.
Chapman v. Edwards, 161 Wash. 268, 295 Pac. 1017 (1931).
9 Remedial legislation has been held to be an exception to the general rule of con-
struing statutes to operate prospectively only, and in the absence of legislative intent
to the contrary, remedial legislation is to be construed retroactively. Pape v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Indus., 43 Wn.2d 736, 264 P.2d 241 (1953) ; Nelson v. Department of
Labor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d 621, 115 P.2d 1014 (1941) ; Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash.
101, 258 Pac. 1039 (1927).
10 Hansen v. West Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 47 Wn.2d 825, 289 P.2d 718 (1955)
Denning v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 296 Pac. 145 (1931) ; Robinson v. McHugh, 158
Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (1930) ; Bruenn v. School Dist., 101 Wash. 374, 172 Pac. 569
(1918).
11 The opposite rules of construction urged by the two factions of the court afford
a beautiful example of the "thrust and parry" technique. See Llewellyn, Remarks on
77Teory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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tory cause of action against the third party tort-feasor. The minority
claimed that it was only a bar to such an action-a statutory defense.
While the immunity statute was in effect, the distinction was not im-
portant since in either case the plaintiff could not win. The distinction
bad never been expressly made in prior decisions, and the court did not
seem to have been aware that one existed.12 In the instant case the
distinction is crucial. If the dissenting view is correct, the constitu-
tional issue posed by the majority would never be reached, for instead
of "creating a cause of action where none existed before," the repealing
statute would have removed only the bar to an already existing action.
This would not have affected the "substantive rights" of defendants,
as many Washington cases point out. Washington is firmly entrenched
in the view that if a cause of action is presently barred by a statutory
limitation, when that limitation period is extended 3 (or abolished 4)
the original action may be brought at any time within the extended
period.' The same rule should be applicable to any cause of action
barred only by virtue of some statute.
The majority rationale that the cause of action was abolished by the
immunity proviso is not convincing. The language of the immunity
statute is more meaningful if interpreted as creating only a bar to the
action. The language is permissive only: "no cause of action may be
brought . . ." Had the legislature intended to abolish the cause of
action, the proper language would have been "no cause of action can
be brought." The majority relied on Hand v. Greyhound Corp." to
support their position, but that case pointed out that the action was
only barred by the immunity proviso."
12 See Robinson v. McHugh, 158 Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (1930), where the court
makes the conflicting statements that "it was the intention of the Legislature to take
away the right of action . . ." and "we can reach no other conclusion than that this
action... is effectively barred. ..
13 Lane v. Department of Labor & Indus., 21 Wn2d 420, 151 P.2d 440 (1944), and
cases cited therein.
'4 Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101, 258 Pac. 1039 (1927).
15 Lane v. Department of Labor & Indus., 21 Wn.2d 420, 426, 151 P.2d 440, 444
(1944), contains the following statement: "There are cases contrary to Campbell v.
Holt and Herr v. Schwager, which hold that, if the remedy is barred, the immunity
from suit is a right that cannot be impaired by a statute of revival, but we definitely
declined in the Herr case to follow them, and we have not departed from the doctrine
of that case."
1649 Wn.2d 171, 299 P.2d 554 (1956).
17 "In the exercise of our best judgment we are inclined to the view that [the im-
munity proviso] ... does not involve an arbitrary unreasonable classification, that it is
constitutional and a bar to appellant's common law tort action for personal injuries."
[Emphasis added.] Hand v. Greyhound Corp., 49 Wn2d 171, 179, 299 P.2d 554, 558
(1956). See also Latimer v. Western Mach. Exch., 42 Wn.2d 756, 259 P.2d 623 (1953) ;
Jewett v. Kerwood, 43 Wn.2d 691, 263 P.2d 830 (1953) ; Koreski v. Seattle Hardware
Co., 17 Wn.2d 421, 135 P2d 860 (1943).
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Although not mentioned in either opinion, there is another argument
that deserves attention. The court has always held that the immunity
proviso was not applicable to a cause of action if either party thereto
was not within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act."
However, the burden of pleading and proving that the immunity at-
tached to a certain action has always been placed on the one claiming
the immunity.' This is sound only if (as the minority contend) the
immunity proviso is considered as creating an affirmative defense" to
an otherwise applicable action. If, as the majority reasoned, the cause
of action was abolished (except when either party thereto was not
within the scope of the act) the burden should have been on the plaintiff
to prove that the exception applied and, hence, the cause of action
attached. For example, the 1933 host-guest statute" provided that all
causes of action by the injured guest were abolished except for an
intentional tort by the host. Under that statute, the burden has always
been placed on the plaintiff-guest to prove that the tort was intentional
(within the exception) and that the action could be brought.22 Analo-
gously, if the majority view is sound, the burden of proof should have
been on the injured workman to bring his otherwise nonexistent cause
of action within the statutory exception.
It is stated within the Workmen's Compensation Act itself that the
act is remedial. 2 Washington" 4 and other jurisdictions" have so held.
When the immunity proviso was first enacted, 6 the court, in Robinson
v. McHugh" and Denning v. Quist,8 held that the immunity was
applicable to injuries occurring before its effective date. 9 Its theory
'8 McClung v. Pratt, 44 Wn.2d 779, 270 P.2d 1063 (1954) ; Latimer v. 'Western
Mach. Exch., 42 Wn.2d 756, 259 P.2d 623 (1953).
19 McClung v. Pratt, supra note 18; Jewett v. Kerwood, 43 Wn.2d 691, 263 P.2d
830 (1953).
20 Other sections of the act have been construed as affirmative defenses. See Mad-
den v. Northern Pac. Ry., 242 Fed. 981 (W.D. Wash. 1917) ; Acres v. Frederick &
Nelson, 79 Wash. 402, 140 Pac. 370 (1914).
21 Wash. Sess. Laws 1933, c. 18 § 1.
2 Taylor v. Taug, 17 Wn.2d 533. 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
23 RCW 51.04.010.
24 Pape v. Department of Labor & Indus., 43 Wn.2d 736, 264 P.2d 241 (1953)
Nelson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d 621, 115 P.2d 1014 (1941) ; Den-
ning v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 296 Pac. 145 (1931).
25 Foster v. Buckner, 203 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Rookledge v. Garwood, 340
Mich. 444, 65 N.W.2d 785 (1954) ; LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 71-
77 (1952).
26 Wash. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 132 § 1.
27 158 rash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (1930).
28 160 Wash. 681, 296 Pac. 145 (1931).
29 In order to avoid this retroactive application of the immunity proviso, the legisla-
ture enacted Wash. Sess. Laws 1931, c. 90 § 1, which provided that the immunity
proviso was not to affect any cause of action or right of appeal existing before its
effective date. Thus, it could have been argued in the Hammack case that since it
[VOL. 35
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was that before final adjudication no one has a vested right to a cause
of action which arises only by virtue of a statute." Thus, it was held
that the legislature could divest the action at any time before final
adjudication. It would seem that the same rule ought to apply to an
immunity created only by virtue of a statute. The dissent stated the
argument as follows:
In the present case, the respondent had no immunity at common law
from answering in damages to persons injured as a proximate result
of its negligent and tortious conduct. The right to such immunity arose
only by virtue of the benefits afforded it as an employer coming within
the scope of the workmen's compensation act. This immunity, having
been granted by the legislature, may be taken away by it, removing the
bar to the exercise of a workman's remedy for injuries suffered. [Citing
Robinson v. McHugh].... The removal of the immunity provision of
the 1957 statute, being remedial in effect and not disturbing a vested
right, comes within the exception to the general rule against retrospec-
tive statutory construction. [Citing Pape v. Department of Labor &
Indus.]3 '
The majority met this argument by stating that this was confusing
rights with remedies and that the distinction was "too fundamental to
be misunderstood." A "right," said the majority, is a "legal conse-
quence" which applies to certain facts" and a "well founded or ac-
knowledged claim,"3 3 while a "remedy" is the procedure used to en-
force a right.34 The majority concluded that the repealing act could
not be remedial because it would create a cause of action where, before,
there was none, (which would impose liability where, before, none ex-
isted) and, hence, the act dealt exclusively with "substantive rights."
This whole line of reasoning is predicated upon the assumption that the
immunity proviso abolished the cause of action, and it is this issue that
is determinative.
To sustain their position the majority quoted from the Idaho case of
Ford v. City of Caldwell,"8 as follows:
A statute will not be given a retroactive construction by which it will
required a special legislative enactment to avoid retroactive application at the inception
of the immunity proviso, the absence of specifically expressed intent in the repealing
act can be construed as legislative intent that this act should operate retrospectively.
This argument was not considered by the court.3 0 Wash. Sess. Laws 1911, c. 74 § 1, RCW 54.01.010, abolished all common law and
other remedies except those otherwise provided by the act.
31 154 Wash. Dec. 217, 231, 339 P.2d 684, 692 (1959).
32 Quoting from Mikkelson v. Pacific SaS. Co., 46 F.2d 124, 125 (W.D. Wash. 1930).
33 Quoting from Chelentis v. Luckenbach, 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918).
34 See notes 32 and 33 supra.35 In the language of the logician this is known as "begging the question."
30 79 Idaho 499, 321 P.2d 589, 594 (1958).
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impose liabilities not existing at the time of its passage. . . . A statute
affecting vested rights will be construed as operating prospectively only,
and not retrospectively. 'A right of defense, not technical, but substan-
tial, resulting in immunity from liability, which has fully vested, is as
sacred and as important as a right of action, and is protected from any
retroactive legislation in like manner as a vested right of action ...
[Emphasis added.]
The use of the Ford case presents an imposing problem, since that case
was concerned with a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. If the
Washington court agrees with the Idaho Court's classification of sov-
ereign immunity as a "right of defense," then it would follow that
statutory immunity would also be a right of defense. However, sov-
ereign immunity is a common-law defense, while the immunity under
consideration is only statutory; and as it is a statutory defense, its
repeal should be applied retroactively in the same manner as is the
repeal of the statutory defense created by a statute of limitations.
Further, did the court imply that the respondent in the Hammack
case had a vested right in his statutory immunity in the same sense that
the city of Caldwell had a vested right in its sovereign immunity? The
basic theory of sovereign immunity is that the "sovereign can do no
wrong." Hence, there is no liability at all, and the sovereign cannot
even be sued unless it waives its immunity. It has never been contended
that the third party tort-feasor under the Workmen's Compensation
Act could not be sued unless he waived the statutory immunity. Such a
construction would be tantamount to saying that once one joins the
"Workmen's Compensation Club," he can injure another club member
with impunity. This was the very reason the Illinois court, in Grasse v.
Dealers Transp. Co., 8 held a similar statutory immunity proviso to be
unconstitutional. 9 Yet in Hand v. Greyhound Corp.,4" when the same
argument was raised, the Washington court distinguished the Grasse
case on the ground that the Illinois act was an "employer liability act,"
while the Washington statute was only an "industrial insurance act."
Thus, as the immunity was granted only as an incidental benefit sub-
ordinate to providing industrial insurance, the immunity proviso was
constitutional. (This was the view taken in the dissenting opinion in
Hammack, under the rule that no one has a vested right in a policy of
37 See cases cited in notes 10 and 15 supra.
38 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
39 The statute was held to be arbitrary and violative of both the United States and
the Illinois constitutions in that it extended immunity to third parties within the act but
did not apply to parties outside the scope of the act. (The Washington immunity statute
applies in exactly the same manner. See cases cited in note 18 supra).
40 49 Wn.2d 171, 299 P.2d 554 (1956).
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legislation, prior to final judgment, which entitles him to insist that the
policy be maintained for his benefit.,")
The majority position was somewhat extricated from this dilemma
by its holding that the repealing act affected only "substantive rights."
However, the distinction between "vested rights" and "substantive
rights" was not made clear and no "guiding principles" were estab-
lished. Apparently the court is not aware of any distinction, as the
recent case of Nogosek v. Truedne z points out. In that case the court,
sitting en banc, construed the Hammack decision as holding that the
legislative enactment affected vested rights and, thus, would not be
retroactively applied. The Nogosek case was a host-guest action insti-
tuted by the injured guest. After the accident but before the trial, the
1957 amendment 3 to the host-guest statute took effect. Under the 1933
statute,"" the injured guest was allowed an action against the host only
for an intentional tort. The 1957 act allows, also, an action for gross
negligence, reinstating the pre-1933 status.4 5 The trial court refused to
instruct the jury as to gross negligence and the supreme court affirmed,
citing Hammack. The difficulty lies not in applying the reasoning of
the Hammack case (which is strictly in point, as the 1933 statute did
abolish all causes of action other than for an intentional tort") but in
citing Hammack as dealing with vested rights. This raises many new
questions which the court did not answer: Is there a difference between
vested rights and substantive rights? If so, what test is determinative?
And,. further, how substantial must a substantive right be to be pro-
tected from retroactive application of legislation?
It is difficult to see how one can have a vested right to a purely
statutory defense unless he has relied on such a defense in committing
the tort. Thus, it would be easy to find a vested right in the immunity
provided to Senators while speaking on the floor of the Senate. Re-
marks are often made there which would not be uttered save for the
protection of the immunity, much as libelous statements are often
made in reliance on the defense of privilege.4 To destroy these de-
41 This rule was announced in Bailey v. School Dist., 108 Wash. 612, 185 Pac. 810
(1919), citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527 (1858).
42 154 Wash. Dec. 940, 344 P.2d 1028 (1959).
43 RCW 46.08.080.
4 Wash. Sess. Laws 1933, c. 18 § 1.
4 Trunk v. Wilkes, 162 Wash. 114, 297 Pac. 1091 (1931) ; Craig v. McAtee, 160
Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146 (1931); Eastman v. Silva, 156 Wash. 613, 287 Pac. 656(1930); Blood v. Austin, 149 Wash. 41, 270 Pac. 103 (1928).
40 Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936). The language of the statute
makes this clear: "No person ... shall have a cause of action . . . unless ... inten-
tional. .. ."
47 International & G.N. R.R. v. Edmundson, 222 S.W. 181 (Texas 1920).
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fenses retroactively could be said to affect vested rights.4 The Nogosek
case can also be rationalized on this theory. The purpose of the 1933
host-guest statute was "not only to do away with collusive suits,49 but
also to make it possible for an owner or driver of an automobile to
invite others to ride with him without fear that, by so doing, he might
subject himself to potential liability in the event that they should be
injured without any intent on his part."5 Statutes of this type are
passed for the express purpose of creating a defense in order to induce
full freedom of action.
If the court was using this theory to decide Hammack, the distinc-
tion made in Hand5 between that case and the Grasse case is repudi-
ated, and those cases are squarely in conflict. If the Hand case is
correct (in that the immunity afforded by the Washington act was only
incidental) it is difficult to see why this fortuitous defense should be
treated any differently than the fortuitous defense afforded by the
statute of limitations. Just as "no man promises to pay money with
any view to being released from that obligation by lapse of time, 5 - no
one negligently injures another with a view of being freed from liability
because he comes under the Workmen's Compensation Act. If the
defense created cannot be relied upon in the commission of the tort, it
is difficult to see how the repeal of that defense can affect any vested
rights.
The Hammack case leaves many questions unanswered and it is
impossible to predict what course of action the court will take in the
future. Within the field of workmen's compensation alone, the issue is
likely to recur. The present act allows the injured workman an election
of remedies: he can either claim compensation under the act or sue the
third party tort-feasor." Should the legislature abolish the election
and allow both remedies, it is questionable whether the court would
follow the Michigan court, which held such a statute to be remedial
and, hence, retroactive. 4 The same issue would arise were the legisla-
ture to abolish the immunity now afforded third party tort-feasors in
the same employ55 as the injured workman. Because of the fact that
48 Ibid.
49 Upchurch v. Hubbard, 29 Wn.2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947) ; Taylor v. Taug, 17
Wn.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
50 Parker v. Taylor, 196 Wash. 22, 25, 81 P.2d 806, 807 (1938).
51 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
52 Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101, 104, 258 Pac. 1039, 1040 (1927) (quoting from
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885)).
53 RCW 51.24.010.




compensation under the act is not afforded for all types of injury,56
there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the "exclusive remedy"
principle of workmen's compensation acts.5" If the legislature responds
to the agitation thus created by allowing suits against persons who are
now immune, the same problems presented by the Hammack case will
recur.
Perhaps the Hammack decision can be rationalized as a policy de-
cision in keeping with the exclusive remedy principle of workmen's
compensation acts by strictly construing those causes of action that
are allowed. This theory is greately weakened by the Nogosek case
which implies that this reasoning will be extended to other statutory
causes of action and defenses as well. T B. GRAHN
TORTS
Torts-Violation of Civil Rights-Damages. In Browning v.
Slenderella Systems' the Washington Supreme Court allowed nominal
damages for embarrassment and humiliation caused by a discriminatory
refusal of service. The action was brought under the public accommo-
dations law,- which is criminal in form.
Mrs. Browning, a Negro, went to the defendant's salon for a courtesy
demonstration of Slenderella reducing treatments. Although an ap-
pointment had been arranged in advance by telephone, she was asked
to wait a few minutes before being served. Nearly two hours later she
was still waiting for her treatment. During this time other ladies came
and were served without undue delay. Mrs. Browning asked a recep-
tionist if she would ever be served and received an evasive reply. The
manager was summoned and Mrs. Browning was informed that the
salon had never served one who was not Caucasian and that she would
not be happy there. This conversation was private and no public scene
was created. No physical violence was threatened. Mrs. Browning
left without being served; shortly thereafter this action was commenced
5 0 The case of Hand v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 17, furnishes a good example.
Plaintiff was injured in a traffic collision and suffered severe facial disfigurement. This
type of injury is not covered by the act, and the plaintiff was denied his suit against the
third party tort-feasor because of the immunity proviso. It was partly as a result of the
Hand case that the legislature abolished the immunity proviso.
57 See SommEas & Somans, WORKmEN'S COMPENSATIoN 191 (1954).
1154 Wash. Dec. 556, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
2 RCW 9.91.010: "(2) Every person who denies to any other person because of race,
creed, or color, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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